Suchergebnisse

Several prominent political economy models of trade policy, at first glance, seem to suggest that leftist governments in Latin America have strong incentives to sign preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The Heckscher-Ohlin model, for instance, predicts that the ideological left in the developing world will favour trade liberalization. Other research, specifically on trade agreements, suggests that leftist governments sign such treaties to credibly signal a commitment to sound economic policies. In light of these predictions, it is perhaps surprising that many left-wing Latin American governments have been especially averse to signing PTAs. In this article, I provide an explanation for the partisan left's disposition toward trade agreements. First, I identify the ways in which PTAs can be difficult to reconcile with hardline or populist left-wing governance. Second, I explore the conditions under which left governments are most inclined to sign trade agreements. I anticipate that regional commonalities and shared partisanship increase the prospects for cooperation. A statistical analysis of PTA signing in 18 Latin American countries, as well as a more in-depth treatment of several cases, yields results consistent with my expectations. These findings have implications for the literature on the political economy of trade agreements as well as the scholarship on globalization in the Latin American context. Adapted from the source document.

A growing number of developed country governments link good governance, including human rights, to developing countries' access to aid, trade, and investment. We consider whether governments enforce these conditions sincerely, in response to rights violations, or whether such conditions might instead be used as a veil for protectionist policies, motivated by domestic concerns about import competition. We do so via an examination of the world's most important unilateral trade preference program, the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which includes worker rights as one criterion for program access. We argue that the two-tiered structure of the GSP privileges some domestic interests at one level, while disadvantaging them at the other. Using a new data set on all US GSP beneficiary countries and sanctioning measures from 1986 to 2013, we demonstrate that labor rights outcomes play a role in the maintenance of country-level trade benefits and that import competition does not condition the application of rights-based criteria at this level. At the same, however, the US government does not consider worker rights in the elements (at the country-product level) of the program that have the greatest material impact. The result is a situation in which the US government talks somewhat sincerely at the country level in its rights-based conditionality, but its behavior at the country-product level cheapens this talk.